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The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s are a turning point in the history of diplomacy and 
international relations between the end of the Cold War and the start of the War on Terror. 
European politicians’ failure to exert enough influence or moral leadership to realise their 
hopes of a new diplomatic role for European powers made the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina a sad counterpoint to celebrations of German reunification and the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1990–2.1 A generation of junior US diplomats in the State Department were marked 
by their inability to persuade superiors in 1992–5 that the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) 
was committing genocide in Bosnia,2 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air 
strikes against Serbia and Montenegro during the Kosovo War were what compelled the 
1 Josip Glaurdić, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2011), 1. This review refers to ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’ as ‘Bosnia’ for ease of reading, though 
specialist literature would usually still refer to ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’ or the abbreviation ‘BiH’.  
2 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (London: Harper Perennial, 2003), 
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British prime minister Tony Blair to issue the most complete statement of his doctrine of 
liberal interventionism.3 The wars are the subject of a rich specialist literature grounded in the 
history and anthropology of the region, but also stand as a recent example in longer 
comparative histories of international intervention.4 Scholarship in many disciplines explores 
the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars; only by viewing these disciplines together, this review 
argues, can historians see how they relate to one another. 
The wars themselves are passing out of the ‘instant history’ they represented when the first 
academic and serious journalistic accounts were being written5 – ‘instant’ because they 
sought to explain wars where the outcome was not even yet known and their conclusions had 
to remain exceptionally contingent – into a mode of contemporary history where archival 
research has started being possible and the wars, though still recent, represent a palpably 
different moment in international security from today. The region’s politics today display 
domestic political disengagement, creeping semi-authoritarianism, endemic socio-economic 
precarity and ongoing international supervision – far from the optimistic expectations of a 
‘post-Cold-War’ period in European history that increasingly seems to have come to an end.  
In academic literature, the wars have thus had parallel afterlives. The historiography of the 
collapse of Yugoslavia, shaped by anthropologists and other social scientists as much as 
historians, turns on the ascription of guilt and responsibility and on how far the wars should 
be explained with reference to ethno-national antagonisms. In Politics and International 
relations, meanwhile, the comparative study of peacebuilding (plus other forms of post-
conflict intervention like transitional justice) places Yugoslav successor states, especially 
Bosnia and Kosovo, among many other case studies of the dynamics, effectiveness and 
politics of international intervention – often addressing practitioners as well as researchers.6 
These two scales might seem difficult to reconcile – and yet as peacebuilding scholars have 
                                                 
3 Oliver Daddow, ‘“Tony’s war”: Blair, Kosovo and the interventionist impulse in British foreign policy’, 
International Affairs 85:3 (2009), 547–60. 
4 For broader studies of the history of humanitarian intervention, see, e.g., Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: the 
Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008); Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi (ed.), 
Contemporary States of Emergency: the Politics of Military and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2010); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: a History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011); Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention: a History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Eyal Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian 
Violence from Arendt to Gaza (London: Verso, 2012); Fabian Klose (ed.), The Emergence of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). 
5 Gale Stokes, John Lampe and Dennison Rusinow with Julie Mostov, ‘Instant history: understanding the wars 
of Yugoslav secession’, Slavic Review 55:1 (1996), 136–60.  
6 See, e.g., Paula M. Pickering, Peacebuilding in the Balkans: the View from the Ground Floor (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2007). 
turned towards the everyday, localised and microhistorical, their research increasingly 
aligned with ethnographers’ insights into how international governance and domestic politics 
had produced the uncertain conditions in which the Yugoslav region finds itself today. 
Meanwhile – as this review of recent works by historians, political scientists, linguists and 
anthropologists shows – the historiography of the Yugoslav wars itself became a social fact in 
the politics of knowledge behind international intervention. 
This is the case because many foreign officials who travelled to the Yugoslav region to 
implement internationally-driven strategies of peacebuilding, transitional justice and 
democratisation brought assumptions about what had caused the Yugoslav wars and how to 
prevent them recurring.7 What they thought they knew about factors like ethnic antagonism, 
postsocialist socio-economic precarity, or organised crime, and how much weight to put on 
each, stemmed in large part from the accounts of the region’s history they had encountered.  
The comparative political scientist of ethnic conflict, Stephen Saideman, once wrote that 
‘[p]erhaps [his] greatest contribution’ to US military thinking during a 2001–2 fellowship 
with the US military’s Joint Staff was to persuade its Balkans Branch to stop assigning 
Robert Kaplan’s essentialising travelogue Balkan Ghosts, which he believed gave 
peacekeepers a harmfully over-simplified context for the conflict.8 What interveners 
understood about post-Yugoslav ethnopolitics – and about the relative importance of 
ethnicity and other social divides in post-Yugoslav politics – therefore informed their 
peacebuilding and statebuilding policies, with consequences for how much political agency 
post-Yugoslav citizens would have after the wars.  
 
Lived experiences of the wars and the postwar peace process have left lasting imprints on the 
kinds of scholarship produced about the wars. The first two books reviewed here, From 
Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans: Studies of a European Disunion, 1991–2011 by the 
lawyer, legal scholar and anthropologist Robert M. Hayden and Radovan Karadžić: Architect 
of the Bosnian Genocide by the historian Robert J. Donia, have both been shaped in different 
ways by the politics of post-conflict intervention and justice.9 While Hayden seeks to open a 
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9 Robert M. Hayden, From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans: Studies of a European Disunion, 1991–2011 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013); Robert J. Donia, Radovan Karadžić: Architect of the Bosnian Genocide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
polemic about what he sees as the hypocrisy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Donia as a frequent expert witness for the prosecution at the 
same tribunal was in the almost unique position of being aggressively cross-examined by the 
subject of his own biography – an experience that gave him a new understanding of the 
Karadžić behind his documentary evidence.10  
Hayden’s From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans collects articles Hayden has published 
on memory politics, ‘genocide’ discourse, the Tribunal, and Bosnian constitutional politics 
over the past two decades; the early chapters function in the volume both as document and 
prediction. Donia’s Karadžić, meanwhile, is a new biographical monograph drawing upon 
newly released evidence that the Tribunal’s prosecutors collected for the trials of Karadžić 
and other defendants. The two books differ vastly in subject matter and methodology, but 
both studies reveal ways that politics and polemics from the early 1990s (when the authors 
took opposed positions on Bosnian independence) have become mapped on to scholarly 
debates, such as their diametrically opposed conclusions about the Tribunal: Donia is an 
experienced expert witness for the prosecution, Hayden a long-time critic of the Tribunal and 
an expert witness in the defence of Dušan Tadić, the Tribunal’s first defendant whose case 
went to trial.11  Among the many matters on which they disagree are their understanding of 
how constructions of ethnic identity of territory led to wars of civilian persecution, and the 
question of what can or should be acknowledged as genocide. These matters remain 
politically and diplomatically sensitive, but also academically contentious.  
Hayden has, for instance, long believed ‘that by classifying recent Yugoslav events as 
“genocide,” the nature of the events themselves is actually obscured rather than explained’, 
and that politicised accusations of genocide during the Bosnian war impeded a quicker end to 
the conflict.12 That quicker end would have been a partition of most or all of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia, in accordance with what Hayden’s reading of the 
eve of war would see as Bosnian Serbs’ and Herzegovinan Croats’ majority wishes. More 
recently, Hayden has argued that laws against genocide denial represent a secular 
‘criminalization of […] unorthodox views’ akin to religious punishment of heresy.13 For 
Donia, however, there is no doubt that political and military proponents of Republika Srpska 
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war had been a national or international conflict. 
12 Hayden, From Yugoslavia, 117, 140–1. 
13 Hayden, From Yugoslavia, 241.  
(RS), the entity that declared itself a Bosnian nation-state and sought to expel non-Serbs from 
its territory, committed genocide. While he does not adopt the maximalism of historians such 
as Edina Bećirević, who argues that Karadžić’s entire campaign against Bosniaks in 1992–5 
should count as genocide, Donia contends that ‘broad judicial and popular agreement’ 
recognises the massacres of 8,372 Bosniak men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995 as 
genocide.14 Throughout the book, Donia unambiguously names this a ‘Bosnian Genocide’ 
and Karadžić, equally indubitably, its ‘architect’.15 Srebrenica is where Hayden comes closest 
to referring to any part of the Bosnian conflict as genocide, though even then his language 
remains conditional.16 While it would be reductive, as Christian Axboe Nielsen argues, to 
reduce the Yugoslav wars’ historiography entirely to ‘a “genocide or not” dichotomy’,17 the 
gulf between Hayden’s and Donia’s approaches to genocide, perhaps even more than their 
conclusions about Bosnian independence in 1992, reveals two very different conceptions of 
the scholar’s task: the reader must determine how far these stem from the authors’ different 
disciplinary traditions.  
Hayden’s collection comprises fifteen previously published articles, plus a new coda, 
‘From EUphoria to EU-goslavia’, extending his long-standing contention that ‘multinational 
polities in Europe have a history of not functioning’ into an argument – written years before 
Brexit had become a mainstream British political option – that the inherent instability of a 
Yugoslav federation built from ethno-national republics under a fictitious pan-Yugoslav 
identity has ominous lessons for the European Union’s stability.18 The chapters combine 
pieces as widely debated as ‘Schindler’s Fate’, Hayden’s polemical 1996 essay on forced 
population transfers in 20th-century history,19 with newer articles about the impossibility of 
reaching a Bosnian constitutional settlement acceptable to majorities in all three ethnic 
groups, older book chapters on the distortion of Second World War body counts in late 
socialist Yugoslavia, and a group of articles on the hypocrisy of international 
‘humanrightsism’ that usefully allows his current perspective on the Tribunal to be read in the 
                                                 
14 See Edina Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).   
15 Donia, Karadžić, 18.  
16 Hayden writes: ‘That mass slaughter may have put, finally, some accuracy into the charges of “genocide” that 
had been made since the very start of the conflict, thus turning “genocide” from politically-inspired label to self-
fulfilling prophecy’ (From Yugoslavia, 141).  
17 Christian Axboe Nielsen, ‘Surmounting the myopic focus on genocide: the case of the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, Journal of Genocide Research 15:1 (2013), 21–39, 21.  
18 Hayden, From Yugoslavia, 387.  
19 See Diane P. Koenker (ed.), ‘Discussion: “Schindler’s fate: genocide, ethnic cleansing, and population 
transfers”’, Slavic Review 55:4 (1996), 727–78, especially Hayden’s original article and the most critical 
response by Carol Lilly.  
context of criticisms Hayden was already making of Helsinki Watch/Human Rights Watch in 
1990. Though not written as a single integrated narrative of the conflict, the chapters can be 
read as a compendium of arguments that have left a mark on theoretical discussions of the 
wars by claiming to bridge legal scholarship and an anthropologist’s ‘holistic approach’.20 
One distinctive feature of Hayden’s approach, his interest in comparing Yugoslavia and 
India, deserves revisiting now that new scholarship on the global Cold War is bringing 
Yugoslav–Indian relations through the Non-Aligned Movement further into light.  
If the main points of Hayden’s scholarship are collected here, so too are what his critics 
claim to be his most serious contextual omissions.21 The first is Hayden’s take on the break-
up of the federal League of Communists in January 1990. He largely blames the Slovenian 
and Croatian parties without describing how Slobodan Milošević (who held significant power 
over the votes of Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro) had shaken the balance of 
power by revoking the provincial autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo and repressing Kosovo 
Albanians’ civil rights. Many Slovenes and Croats started fearing that they might share this 
fate.  
Hayden’s implication that Bosnians of different ethnicities had never demanded to live 
together in a sovereign Bosnian state has also drawn criticism, for not accommodating the 
forms of Bosnian belonging, across and beyond ethnic boundaries, that existed as social 
alternatives until nationalist political coalitions and outright violence suppressed them. For 
example, Hayden’s chapter on ‘The Partition of Bosnia’, originally written in May 1993, 
speaks throughout of Muslims, Croats and Serbs, never of multi-ethnic or non-ethnic forms 
of political community – yet, as more recent social and intellectual histories of late socialist 
Bosnia show,22 such demands for political community were being made in Bosnia on the eve 
of war. But these alternative voices were suppressed politically by nationalists and physically 
by the snipers who fired on a multi-ethnic peace demonstration in Sarajevo on 5 April 1992 – 
a demonstration called to celebrate international recognition of the very independence for 
                                                 
20 Hayden, From Yugoslavia, xii. 
21 See, e.g., Carol S. Lilly, ‘Amoral realism or immoral obfuscation?’, Slavic Review 55:4 (1996), 749–54; 
Thomas Cushman, ‘Anthropology and genocide in the Balkans: an analysis of conceptual practices of power’, 
Anthropological Theory 4:1 (2004), 5–28; Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates 
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22 See, e.g., Neven Andjelić, Bosnia-Herzegovina: the End of a Legacy (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Dalibor 
Mišina, Shake, Rattle and Roll: Yugoslav Rock Music and the Poetics of Social Critique (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2013); Ljubica Spaskovska, The Last Yugoslav Generation: the Rethinking of Youth Politics and Cultures in 
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which Hayden has contended there was no mass Bosnian demand.23 While ‘the terminologies 
of description used since 1991 by the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to describe 
themselves’ might indeed have made ‘Bosnians’ by that name a ‘vanishing category’,24 those 
terminologies were the product of political processes which had deliberately undermined the 
space where such a category could exist. Those who eschewed ethnic political identities had 
the least access to political and diplomatic, let alone military, power.  
Donia’s study of Karadžić, meanwhile, is less a traditional biography, more the most 
exhaustive account in English of how Karadžić and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) planned 
and orchestrated their campaign. Donia shows how the SDS first monopolised power in Serb-
majority municipalities during autumn 1991, then how they founded an ‘Autonomous Region 
of Krajina’ using a plebiscite boycotted by most non-Serbs, and finally how they unleashed a 
campaign of paramilitary and military violence against non-Serbs and politically unwelcome 
Serbs. In developing his biography, Donia makes use of a complete set of transcripts from the 
Bosnian Serb Assembly, hundreds of telephone intercepts that security services in the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina began collecting in May 1991, SDS internal documents, 
diaries written by Ratko Mladić (which Serbian investigators found in his Belgrade apartment 
in 2010), Karadžić’s own speeches, and other major ideological documents in the history of 
the Yugoslav wars, such as the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences memorandum of 1986 
or the Slovenian Nova revija manifesto of 1987. Indeed, Donia places Karadžić’s ‘six 
strategic goals’ speech of 12 May 1992 (prima facie evidence that the SDS’s takeovers of 
towns and villages were part of a planned programme of territorial expansion and control, not 
just spontaneous ‘hatred’) among these as a key document for understanding the wars. In 
pursuit of this programme, Donia unwaveringly shows, ‘Radovan Karadžić planned, ordered, 
monitored, and sought to justify the Srebrenica genocide’ of July 1995 ‘with forethought, 
decisiveness, and calm detachment’.25 While letting judges determine criminal 
responsibility,26 Donia attributes moral responsibility as firmly as a historian can: a necessary 
statement about crimes which two decades later are still beset by obfuscation. 
Whereas Hayden’s arguments rest on his observation of the lack of consensus about a 
Bosnian demos in 1992, Donia shows what processes convinced Bosnians between 1990 and 
1992 that only affiliation with the cause of one ethno-national group or another could protect 
                                                 
23 Kemal Kurspahić, Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace (Washington DC: US Institute of 
Peace Press, 2003), 99; Hayden, From Yugoslavia, xvii.  
24 Hayden, From Yugoslavia, 77–8. 
25 Donia, Karadžić, 250. 
26 Donia, Karadžić, 17. 
them, and what strategies of intimidation were necessary to break the Bosnian polity apart. 
His focus on the RS and Karadžić supports and extends existing accounts of the immediate 
background to the Bosnian conflict and the planned, deliberate nature of the violence 
committed in pursuit of an ethnically pure Serb state; 27 historians would be well served if 
other parties such as the Bosnian Croat ‘Herceg-Bosna’ entity or Fikret Abdić’s Bihać 
enclave received such exhaustive treatment.  
In using so much Tribunal documentation, Donia’s study also joins an expanding literature 
on the Tribunal and its prosecutorial strategy.28 The politics of how and why the Tribunal was 
formed, how it operated, what parties it chose (not) to investigate (Hayden rightly asks why 
NATO commanders were not investigated for using cluster munitions over Serbia and 
Montenegro in 199929), and how prosecutors and defence lawyers actively deployed 
historical evidence in constructing cases are all part of the context of how such evidence 
became available to historians. This archival methodology is very different from Hayden’s 
interpretive use of legal and anthropological theory. Both authors also differ in how and when 
their narratives begin, and in their perspectives on the viability of a multi-ethnic Bosnian 
state. However, they have one thing at least in common: both explain how the Bosnian war 
was driven by conflicts over how the ethnic identity of a piece of territory should be 
determined and which nation’s right to sovereignty should then hold sway. .  While historians 
have investigated these linkages between ethnicity, territory and sovereignty in order to reach 
a deeper understanding of nationalism and genocide in contemporary European history, 
research in the field of peacebuilding explores a similar configuration of factors in order to 
solve practical problems on the ground. But, as the following section will suggest, historians 
interested in both the regional history of the Yugoslav wars and global histories of 
international intervention might benefit from the insights offered by research into 
peacebuilding. 
 
The field of peacebuilding research is itself a product of the post-conflict intervention of the 
1990s, and has focused intensively on Bosnia and Kosovo as case studies. While scholars of 
south-east European area studies have been preoccupied by ethnicity and nationalism, the 
central question for the study of peacebuilding is how to prevent a return to violence and 
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Richard Ashby Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011).   
29 Hayden, From Yugoslavia, 215. 
what constitutes ‘peace’. In the mid-2000s, a new wave of peacebuilding scholars became 
fascinated by the everyday and micropolitical dimensions of peacebuilding, bringing the field 
closer to ethnographic and historical modes of perception. This ‘local turn’ emerged in 
response to postcolonial, Marxist,30 or purely pragmatic critiques of Western interventionist 
notions of the ‘liberal peace’ espoused by British and US governments (and many others) 
after the Kosovo War and the beginnings of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.31 The ‘local 
turn’ approach to peacebuilding focused on exploring ‘hybrid’ forms of peace resulting from 
interactions between local and international actors, and on understanding ‘everyday’ forms of 
peace-making among local civil society or grassroots organisations.32 Kosovo and/or Bosnia 
are quite common examples in theoretical studies of hybrid or everyday peace.33 This new 
literature on the practices of peacebuilding draws on ethnographic approaches and 
microhistorical analysis, and may offer historians new insights into the exercise of power and 
knowledge in international intervention.  
The next three works reviewed exemplify this turn to the ‘local’, and focus in particular on 
the barriers that prevent international peacebuilders gaining enough ‘local’ knowledge to 
bring about or even comprehend what inhabitants of post-conflict societies might perceive as 
peace. Peacebuilding scholars became more conscious of this question after the publication of 
Séverine Autesserre’s Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of 
International Intervention in 2014, though it echoes questions that anthropologists had 
already been raising.34 Elton Skendaj’s Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the 
Making of Ethical Institutions focuses on the United Nations Interim Administration in 
Kosovo (UNMIK). Unlike the layers of Bosnian civil administration under international 
                                                 
30 On Bosnia in this vein, see David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, 2nd ed. (London: 
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for Bosnia at Dayton.  
34 Séverine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
oversight created by the Dayton Peace Agreement of December 1995, civil administration in 
Kosovo was wholly the responsibility of UNMIK until local politicians, frustrated at the 
length of time it was taking to negotiate a road-map to independence with Serbia, issued a 
unilateral declaration of independence in 2007 and passed a new constitution in 2008. 
Skendaj provides locally grounded – and historically informed – analyses of attempts to 
reconfigure public institutions in order to create democracy, peace and liberal reform in post-
conflict Kosovo.35 
Peacebuilding in Kosovo was shaped both by the liberal interventionism of Blair and the 
‘Bosnia generation’ of US diplomats, and by Western disillusionment after the failure of 
utopian statebuilding in 2000s Afghanistan and Iraq. Skendaj’s Creating Kosovo uses 
questionnaires and interviews with reformers of Kosovo’s police, customs service, central 
state bureaucracy and courts in order to test the hypothesis that placing state institutions 
under ‘local’ control too early is not effective in achieving interveners’ goals.36 Skendaj 
concludes that the state bodies that enjoyed most public confidence, operated most effectively 
and were least vulnerable to corruption were those which international institutions had most 
successfully insulated from the local political system (the customs service and police); those 
with the most local ownership, the judiciary and central administration, were most vulnerable 
to political patronage and least trusted by citizens.  
Skendaj’s account of politics in Kosovo might interest historians firstly because it traces 
the legacies of socialist, pre-war state structures into wartime and post-war Kosovo, which 
some presentist peacebuilding research might not take into account. Secondly, it  shows that 
political clientelism, more than ethnicity, determined Albanians’ political position: in 
particular, ex-members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), led by Hashim Thaçi, and 
their regional clients from the Drenica Valley, came to be at odds with networks from the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the party that had aligned with Kosovo’s branch of the 
Socialist Alliance for Working People to lead non-violent resistance to Milošević.37 Skendaj 
does not fully develop the historical explanation of patronage that his background about the 
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KLA and LDK factions might invite; it is sufficient, for his purposes, to know that it exists. 
The histories of why NATO challenged Milošević in 1999 or why the UN took over 
Kosovo’s international administration afterwards are, likewise, mostly outside its remit, to the 
point that the background narrative at one point describes ‘NATO soldiers’, not UN ones, as 
responsible for failing to prevent ‘mass murder’ at Srebrenica in 1995.38 Creating Kosovo 
exemplifies a problem-solving approach to peacebuilding and democratisation, oriented 
towards improving future interventions as much as, or more than, explaining how Kosovo’s 
current condition came to be.  
Despite the tendency towards theoretical abstraction in some peacebuilding research, some 
studies succeed in conveying the spatial and historical nuances of a post-conflict society. 
Adam Moore’s Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns, based 
on ethnographic observation, archival research and 120 interviews collected during visits to 
Brčko and Mostar in 2004–12, compares two Bosnian cities in ostensibly similar 
circumstances (both were and are the subjects of ethno-territorial disputes that stemmed from 
the war and have persisted since Dayton) where peacebuilding has nevertheless had different 
outcomes and where international–local relationships, Moore finds, have also had a different 
character.39  
While Mostar remains contested between the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which 
has monopolised the urban space and economy of western Mostar, and the Bosniak 
nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA), with its power base in the east of the city, 
negotiators at Dayton could not agree whether to award Brčko (a pinchpoint between the 
northern and eastern halves of the RS) to the RS or the Federation. The Brčko Final Award of 
March 1999, announced by a US administrator, made the Brčko District a distinct multiethnic 
government (on Federation and RS territory but under the authority of neither). Its political 
system was deliberately designed to promote political and social integration, eschewing the 
institutionalised ethnic power-sharing approach that Dayton had applied to the rest of Bosnia, 
including Mostar. Brčko would go on to have Bosnia’s only integrated school system, 
whereas the obstacles to integrating even one school in Mostar – let alone to using its 
integration as a platform for reintegrating social interaction in the rest of the city – are richly 
described by Azra Hromadžić’s ethnography of the Mostar Gymnasium.40 Mostar is, after 
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Sarajevo and Srebrenica, probably the most commonly researched city in post-war Bosnia;41 
there are fewer studies of Brčko, yet those that exist all suggest the ethnicity–territory nexus 
operated somewhat differently in social and political practice there.42 Moore’s study is thus 
another example of how recent research into Bosnian towns’ and cities’ specific historical 
and socio-economic contexts has helped historians to understand the multiple and localised 
conflicts that combined to constitute the war in Bosnia.43  
The power and authority of international agencies was also, Moore shows, constituted 
through localised interactions and thus operated in different ways across the country. Moore, 
like Visoka, is interested in emergent ‘configurations’ of power,44 and his greater level of 
localised texture further illustrates them. The strategy that the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) in Brčko found for achieving its integrative peacebuilding aims 
depended on acting as a patron for local political and economic interests vis-à-vis OHR 
Sarajevo, which in 2002–6 under Paddy Ashdown sought to bring the Brčko office under its 
direct control.45 By shifting supervision of Brčko to Sarajevo in 2007, the OHR lost the 
‘intimate knowledge of current developments in the District – […] the product of intensive 
daily interactions with local officials’ which until then appeared to have set peacebuilding in 
Brčko apart, at least on an institutional level: it was little wonder, Moore suggests, that local 
support for the OHR’s presence in Bosnia had declined to 15 per cent by 2010.46  
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What distinguishes Peacebuilding in Practice from peacebuilding studies with a wider and 
more abstract lens is not only its richer post-war context but its attention to how wartime 
legacies in both cities structured political and social conditions, which is also an important 
foundation for historians considering the legacies of war. If knowledge of the conflict in 
Mostar between the Croat Defence Council (HVO) and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (ARBiH), representing the government in Sarajevo, and of how HDZ elites 
monopolised the privatisation of Party-owned factories, is essential for understanding the 
division of post-war Mostar, so too is the less well-known history behind the unpopularity of 
SDA among its ostensible Bosniak constituency in Brčko – dating back to the day in May 
1992 when the SDA’s president in Brčko, Mustafa Ramić, was forced to appear on television 
with a commander from the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) to reassure non-Serbs there was 
no need to leave Brčko just as Serb paramilitaries were entering the town to round them up.47 
These were self-evidently part of the everyday contexts that peacebuilders in each city would 
find.  
And yet, in the practice of international intervention, such nuances are often ignored. 
Intervention agencies assume that strategies for conflict resolution and stabilisation can be 
duplicated in any post-conflict situation. A major reason for this absence of institutional 
contextual knowledge is that international interveners do not speak local languages, and thus 
have no access to everyday cultural knowledge.48 Autesserre argues precisely this in 
Peaceland – and, indeed, six years before, the anthropologist Andrew Gilbert had similarly 
argued after ethnographic research with the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in 
Europe (OSCE) in Bosnia that the OSCE obtained an inaccurate picture of Bosnian politics 
and society because it devalued local staff’s expertise and privileged knowledge that could be 
easily expressed in English within the genre of a conventional written report.49Mediation 
between languages is fundamental to the practice of peacebuilding yet almost always taken 
for granted by peacebuilders themselves.50  
Most international staff of intervention agencies never acquire linguistic fluency, many do 
not even seek to, and many organisations would not even keep them in post long enough to 
acquire it. The mostly locally-recruited language intermediaries on whom they depend for 
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written translation and spoken interpreting – much more complex tasks than many non-
linguists are likely to appreciate – are relied upon as unofficial cultural brokers and mediators 
while in post yet, paradoxically, overlooked as exercisers of agency even in most 
peacebuilding research. Ian Jones and Louise Askew’s Meeting the Language Challenges of 
NATO Operations, the next work reviewed, provides what very few studies of peacebuilding 
even attempt to acknowledge, let alone foreground: recognition that the knowledge 
production and therefore the effectiveness of peacebuilding depends on – that the 
relationships between ‘international’ and ‘local’ at the heart of peacebuilding research are 
actually constituted by – acts of mediation between languages.   
In Meeting the Language Challenges of NATO Operations, Jones and Askew, as 
professional linguists who worked in NATO’s field language services in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
then Afghanistan, combine their first-hand experiences as NATO insiders with scholarly 
analysis of ‘the mechanics of language policy formulation in an international organisation.’51 
They also show that NATO’s operational language policy developed in the wider context of 
NATO’s search for a new purpose in international security after the reunification of Germany 
and the collapse of the USSR in 1991.52 Russian contributions to peace enforcement in 
Bosnia, for instance, represented the first ‘operational cooperation’ between NATO and 
Russian forces, requiring linguists to create a new Russian military vocabulary for NATO 
concepts such as command and control.53  
Jones and Askew’s detailed accounts of establishing and managing the field language 
services reveal a history of technological change that improved the workflows of predictable 
office-based translation between the 1980s and the late 2000s but did not solve the 
complexities of translation and interpreting in post-conflict peacebuilding, where documents 
containing significant knowledge rarely materialised in pristine, machine-readable form. HQ 
SFOR’s word processing software in the late 1990s, for instance, could not even 
accommodate the Cyrillic script in which Serbian was often printed (the very kind of 
everyday barrier to knowledge circulation that Autesserre and Gilbert so often observed).54 
The failure of NATO or SFOR commanders to appreciate how heavily their operations 
depended on accurate and effective translation and interpreting is evident from the fact that it 
took SFOR two years to invite the professional chief of NATO’s own language service to 
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even make recommendations about how language support ought to be organised in Bosnia; 
once Jones had devised a plan for centralising and upgrading SFOR’s language service, 
including relatively much more employment security and professional development than 
locally-recruited linguists at other military and civilian intervention agencies enjoyed, it took 
three further years for him to be invited to review the language service in Kosovo.55  
Meeting the Language Challenges contributes to scholarship on the micropolitics of 
international intervention by drawing attention to the agency, and the positionality, of 
language intermediaries themselves within the dynamics of knowledge production in 
international intervention and the everyday performances of power and security through 
which intervention takes place. At the same time, the study is itself a product of knowledge 
production within an international organisation: Jones and Askew were both part of 
institutional structures which depended on acquiring and applying ‘local’ knowledge, before 
they came to write those structures’ history. Readers used to the conventions of 
anthropological or feminist research might expect longer reflections on how some 
interviewees’ working histories as subordinates of Jones or Askew would affect the interview 
dynamic, or how interview-based methodologies themselves might be limited in what 
knowledge they can collect about patronage and the informal economy, than this book 
provides. Historians might develop broader structural arguments around the placement of one 
expert figure at the centre of the narrative. Yet the fact that a history of NATO’s field 
language services can even be contained within one expert’s experiences reflects the lack of 
awareness throughout NATO and its missions about how language and interlinguistic 
mediation affect knowledge-gathering and interoperability: a history of NATO logistics, 
civil–military co-operation or intelligence could not be told this way. While the book does 
not systematically connect its findings with the diplomatic history of NATO or the transition 
from Cold War to post-Cold-War, it will be an invaluable resource when an archival history 
of NATO language policy comes to be written.  
 
The final volume reviewed here, Stef Jansen, Čarna Brković and Vanja Čelebičić’s 
Negotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, demonstrates how anthropological 
perspectives can shed light on questions of interest to both historians and peacebuilding 
practitioners or researchers.56 Cécile Jouhanneau’s chapter on how and when former camp 
                                                 
55 Jones and Askew, Meeting the Language Challenges, 80. 
56 Stef Jansen, Čarna Brković and Vanja Čelebičić (ed.), Negotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Semiperipheral Entanglements (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).  
detainees from Brčko choose to testify publicly about their wartime experience, or Karla 
Koutková’s chapter arguing that the social categories of ‘locals’ and ‘internationals’ in 
international agencies are produced through practice rather than depending inherently on 
workers’ nationality, for instance, align well with debates over testimony and silence in 
transitional justice, or the emerging literature on the locally-recruited staff of international 
agencies, respectively.57 Other chapters tackle topics such as families’ anxieties for the care 
of their elderly relatives in a healthcare system which owes its catastrophic conditions to the 
wartime expropriation of state property, the clientelistic post-war development of a market 
economy and the stagnation of the cantonal government structure built into the Dayton Peace 
Agreement itself. These approaches were inspired by historically-minded anthropologists 
who have called attention to the effects of the collapse of Yugoslav state socialism as much 
as the effects of inter-ethnic conflict, thus inspiring historical reassessments of late state 
socialism as well as new anthropological and sociological research on the present.58 To 
understand Bosnia (or the rest of the region), the editors write, ‘we need to go “beyond” the 
Dayton lens, and particularly its identitarian matrix’ of ethnicity.’59   
Alongside the ‘chronotope of the round table’ of peace negotiations, by which the editors 
denote the mode of defining Bosnia primarily in terms of three fixed and opposed ethnic 
groups, Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić propose three other modes of representing Bosnia. 
One is the chronotope of the ‘swamp’ or semi-periphery, where footing is uncertain and 
individuals struggle against the ‘ever-present threat, of sinking’: this recognises the many 
geopolitical ‘in-between’ positions ascribed to the region in the past and present and applies a 
timeframe which is as much ‘post-socialist, or perhaps better: post-Cold War and post-
Fordist’ as post-conflict.60 Another is the chronotope of the ‘labyrinth’, through which 
statebuilders believe they have offered a map by holding out the prospect of ‘liberal–
multiculturalist’ transformation within Euro-Atlantic structures, and where ‘[o]nly the 
supervisors […] have the overview that can guide Bosnians to the exit’ – the very image of 
what peacebuilding studies call the liberal peace.61 The third is the chronotope of the ‘waiting 
                                                 
57 Cécile Jouhanneau, ‘The discretion of witnesses: war camp memories between politicisation and civility’, in 
Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić (ed.), Negotiating Social Relations, 31–45; Karla Koutková, ‘“The king is 
naked”: internationality, informality and ko fol state-building’, in Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić (ed.), 
Negotiating Social Relations, 109–21. 
58 Xavier Bougarel, Ger Duijzings and Elissa Helms (ed.), The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories, and 
Moral Claims in a Post-War Society (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić, ‘Introduction’, 
10. 
59 Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić, ‘Introduction’, 10. 
60 Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić, ‘Introduction’, 11–15.  
61 Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić, ‘Introduction’, 16. 
room’, already in common use in Bosnian political discourse, that represents Bosnia as a 
society where ‘a variety of people are thrown together’ by the fact that they are ‘waiting for 
something, and that their progress towards that something is determined by others, who are 
running the offices behind the closed doors surrounding the waiting room’.62 These 
alternative modes of representation reveal a very different picture of the Bosnian demos to the 
image that Hayden (who finds Jansen too idealistic on this matter63) believes had already 
been an illusion in 1992. Once the Dayton negotiators themselves – Western, Bosnian, 
Serbian and Croatian – agreed on the assumption of an antagonistic ethnic triangle as the only 
imaginable form of social relations in Bosnia, while wartime political elites remained in 
power, the political expression of any alternative demos became impossible within the 
Dayton structure even as the international managers of the ‘waiting room’ pressured the 
ethnicised three-part demos to transform.  
Negotiating Social Relations thus also makes an essential contribution to the literature on 
the consequences of the Yugoslav wars in emphasising the temporality of uncertainty as the 
defining condition of life in post-conflict and post-socialist Bosnia since 1995. The sense of 
waiting, stuckness, or ‘yearning’64 that Jansen first observed in ethnographic research with 
Bosnian refugees subject to temporary protection measures in the European Union during the 
1990s (when they did not know if they would be allowed to stay in their new countries or sent 
back) has also turned out to structure life in Bosnia itself for anyone without the informal 
connections (‘veze’ or ‘štele’) to prosper as part of the post-Dayton elite.65   
 
 
Two decades after the end of the Bosnian conflict, the EU and NATO still seem to hold 
out Bosnia’s movement towards joining these Euro-Atlantic institutions as a long-term 
strategy for peace, however illusory this hope may be.66 Kosovo, meanwhile, occupies an 
even more tightly enclosed waiting room where the politics of Serbian negotiations with the 
EU, and Russian instrumentalisation of Kosovo in its own foreign policy, leave no alternative 
                                                 
62 Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić, ‘Introduction’, 17. 
63 Hayden, From Yugoslavia, 343–4. 
64 See Stef Jansen, Yearnings in the Meantime: ‘Normal Lives’ and the State in a Sarajevo Apartment Complex 
(New York: Berghahn, 2015).  
65 Stef Jansen, ‘The privatisation of home and hope: return, reforms and the foreign intervention in Bosnia-
Herzegovina’, Dialectical Anthropology 30:3–4 (2006), 177–99; Stef Jansen, Yearnings in the Meantime: 
‘Normal Lives’ and the State in a Sarajevo Apartment Complex (New York: Berghahn, 2015). 
66 See Danijela Majstorović, Zoran Vučkovac and Anđela Pepić, ‘From Dayton to Brussels via Tuzla: post-2014 
economic restructuring as europeanization discourse/practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies 15:4 (2015), 661–82.  
future in immediate view. Scholars whose careers and disciplines are grounded in the 
specifics of the Yugoslav region, and scholars who study the Yugoslav region primarily as 
part of comparative analyses with a global reach, have wrestled with – and contributed to – 
the metahistory of knowledge production about the 1990s wars, their aftermath and the 
meanings of inter-ethnic relations in contemporary post-Yugoslav societies. These are not 
separate camps from each other, and indeed are finding increasing amounts of common 
ground as international peacebuilding researchers discover ways of knowing that 
anthropologists have long held as common sense. If peacebuilding studies can learn from the 
interdisciplinary history–anthropology–sociology of the Yugoslav region about how 
important an understanding of localised contexts and legacies is for appreciating the everyday 
micropolitics of peace, the juxtapositions which international peacebuilding studies routinely 
create between the Yugoslav region and other sites of intervention point to a transnational 
lens on the region’s contemporary – and older – history that connects it not just with the rest 
of Europe but with the whole globe.  
The international military and civilian missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste and 
Afghanistan, to name only those that appear in the works reviewed here, belong to an 
optimistic and confident period in the history of international intervention that has already 
subsided, though semi-transformed structures of international supervision over all four 
countries still persist. The histories of this moment of intervention that are yet to be written 
will surely take up among their major themes the production and circulation of knowledge 
about peace and conflict: this was a milieu where interpretations and conclusions from one 
conflict zone were routinely translated less appropriately or more appropriately into policy 
and practice in another, where both ‘internationals’ and inhabitants of sites of intervention 
could find themselves travelling through a global political economy of peacebuilding, 
governance and military power. What perhaps distinguishes the past they describe from the 
present in which they appear is that the timescale for the Yugoslav region’s exit from the 
‘waiting room’ of international oversight, and the form of society or political system it might 
exit with, has become less clear rather than clearer with the passage of time. The conversion 
of hope into uncertainty is, in many ways, what marks the waning of the ‘post-Cold-War’. 
  
